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Abstract. Employing the case study of the cultivation of African palms for the 
production of palm oil in Chiapas, Mexico, this article probes the theme of alter-
native patterns of development to neo-liberal globalization. In particular, it dis-
cusses the issue of the return to state intervention (neo-Fordism) as an instrument 
to promote socio-economic development. Chiapas has been the theatre of the Za-
patista movement of 1994. As a result of that popular uprising and despite its 
overtly neo-liberal posture, the Mexican state intervened significantly in Chiapas. 
In this context, the monoculture of the African palm has been pursued as a strat-
egy to address local poverty among farmers, generate alternative and renewable 
forms of energy and provide a scheme for socio-economic growth in the area. This 
article illustrates the contradictory results of this ‘interventionist’ developmental 
project and the consequences and resistance that it entailed. The analysis of this 
case reveals the problematic nature of nation-state led interventionist schemes in 
a context marked by the emerging crisis of the neo-liberal model. It also under-
scores the significance of local initiatives that are generated by the aspirations and 
abilities of local residents.
Introduction
In the 1970s, the crisis of the Fordist regime (O’Connor, 1974; Habermas, 1975; Bo-
nanno et al., 1994) ushered the era of neo-liberal globalization (D. Harvey, 2005). For 
the last three decades, neo-liberalism has offered the ideological underpinning for 
the construction of an increasingly global capitalism. The claim that the economy 
and society work better when the market functions autonomously and is free from 
state intervention and regulation defines our times. Characterized by a high level of 
capital mobility, deregulation, expanding transnational networks of production and 
consumption, global private standards, and accelerated exploitation of labour and 
natural resources, neo-liberal globalization is the dominant form of contemporary 
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capitalism (Stiglitz, 2003; D. Harvey, 2010; Bonanno and Cavalcanti, 2011). In recent 
years, however, recurrent economic, political, and social crises have allowed many 
commentators to contend that neo-liberal globalization has experienced a legitima-
tion crisis: neo-liberalism cannot keep its promises to society, and its class dimen-
sion is overt (e.g. Lupel, 2005; Helleiner, 2010; Dumenil and Levy, 2011; Raulet, 2011; 
Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn, 2012). Similar arguments have been made for agri-
culture and food (Busch, 2011; Bonanno, 2012). The essence of this position can be 
summarized in three points. First, the theory of neo-liberalism is far removed from 
reality. There are too many unjustified assumptions and inadequate interpretations 
about the functioning of society to justify the statement that reality is accurately 
reflected by this theory. Second, the outcomes of neo-liberalism favour dominant 
groups overwhelmingly. The world elite, the so-called ‘one percent’ (Flank, 2011; 
Van Gelder, 2011; Byrne, 2012; Collins, 2012), has benefited enormously from neo-
liberalism while the middle and lower classes and the global poor have seen their 
socio-economic conditions deteriorating. Third, the application of neo-liberal meas-
ures leads to recurrent economic, social, and environmental crises. Often, solutions 
to these crises have not been sought through free-market oriented measures but 
through state intervention. From the financial sector to natural disasters, to employ-
ment and economic growth, the market has not been able to address crises. Con-
versely, calls for state intervention (i.e., bailouts, clean-ups, stimulus programmes) 
have been seen as more desirable and have been proposed from all sides, including 
global corporations.
It is this recurrent request for state intervention that represents the backbone of 
arguments about the developing legitimation crisis of neo-liberalism and the attrac-
tiveness of neo-Fordist state interventionist strategies (Underhill and Zhang, 2008; 
Tabb, 2010; Krippner, 2011; Krugman, 2012; Pollard, 2012). Despite calls for less reg-
ulation stemming from the intellectual and political right (Bhagwati, 2004; Cohen 
and DeLong, 2010; Greenwood, 2011), state intervention has emerged as the most 
commonly sought and practiced response to the crisis of neo-liberal mechanisms 
and of neo-liberal globalization itself. Summarizing this sentiment and lauding the 
virtues of the Fordist era, the left-leaning economist and Nobel laureate Paul Krug-
man (2012) contends that, today, Fordist-style state intervention can generate both 
balanced economic growth and a much more just society.1
Literature on the legitimation crisis of neo-liberalism (e.g. Lupel, 2005; Helleiner, 
2010; Raulet, 2011; Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn, 2012; for agri-food, see Wolf and 
Bonanno, 2014) underscores that the search for solutions to the various crises of neo-
liberalism (i.e. financial, economic, environmental, social and political) generated 
two major types of responses. The first camp proposes a greater dose of free market 
mechanisms (e.g. Bhagwati, 2004; Cohen and DeLong, 2010; Greenwood, 2011). It 
is argued that the market is still very much constrained by state intervention and 
regulation. Therefore, further deregulation, reduced state intervention and austerity 
measures are the prescribed solutions. The second camp (e.g. Lupel, 2005; Raulet, 
2011; Krugman, 2012; for a review of this literature, see Hudis, 2013) contends that 
in mature capitalism, market mechanisms engender instability and crises. Accord-
ingly, it is enhanced state intervention that is required to address existing problems. 
They call for the end of austerity politics and propose a return to Fordist-style state 
intervention and policies (neo-Fordism). Most of the positions within this camp do 
not necessarily subscribe to the ‘regimes of accumulation’ thesis. In these accounts, 
rather than a regime, neo-liberalism is seen as a complex of actions and ideological 
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constructs that is dominant in society but that can be, and is, opposed. It is not neces-
sarily a system, but it represents those more or less organized forms through which 
the dominant class attempts to maintain power. Alternative actions based on differ-
ent ideological constructs are possible. A return to enhanced state intervention in the 
economy and society, they content, is the desirable solution for current problems.
As these neo-Fordist calls for a return to an interventionist state characterize de-
bates over the evolution of neo-liberal globalization, doubts remain about the ef-
fectiveness of a solution that has encountered significant limits and criticisms in the 
past (O’Connor, 1974; Habermas, 1975; Lipietz, 1992; Wolf and Bonanno, 2014). Ac-
cordingly, the objective of this article is to probe the effectiveness of calls that wish 
to propose more state intervention. We wish to contribute to discussions that seek 
alternatives to neo-liberalism but also contemplate concerns about the use of state 
intervention. Ultimately, we would like to offer some insights into the possibility 
that market mechanisms and state intervention may not necessarily be appropriate 
solutions to the problems of today’s society.
 This theme is probed by examining the consequences of the reintroduction of 
Fordist-style measures as solutions to the current crises of neo-liberalism. More spe-
cifically, this article offers some insights into the contradictions generated by state 
intervention in developmental schemes in agriculture and food in a less-developed 
region of the South. It studies the case of the implantation of palm oil production in 
the state of Chiapas in Mexico (see Figure 1).
This is a case in which the – otherwise neo-liberal2 – Mexican state intervened 
to promote the cultivation of African palms for the production of agrofuel in the 
state of Chiapas. Because of the political, historical and socio-economic conditions 
that characterize Chiapas, and for the case of this state only, the Mexican state has 
maintained an interventionist posture that resembles past Fordist strategies as its 
Figure 1. Chiapas, Mexico.
Source: authors’ elaboration on map from Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.
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double objective has been to promote socio-economic development and maintain 
social legitimation.3 As indicated above, the research question that is addressed in 
this work refers to the desirability and effectiveness of a social system characterized 
by state intervention. While the complexity of this issue prevents this article from 
being exhaustive, this case study offers some elements that could contribute to the 
discussion on alternatives to neo-liberal globalization and new forms of Fordism 
(neo-Fordism) (Bonanno, 2012; Krugman, 2012).
We employed a case-study methodology. The case has been researched through 
the examination of existing documents and quantitative data, interviews with key 
informants, and site visits. Interviews were carried out in palm producing areas in 
the regions of Soconusco and Costa, which are among the primary palm producing 
regions in Chiapas (see Figure 2).
Data were analysed through the use of techniques of saturation and negative cases 
whereby the conclusions were confronted with alternative interpretations that were 
not selected. This posture allows for the generalization of conclusions (Berg, 2007; 
Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). This article is divided into five sections. The first analy-
ses the historical context of the case. It discusses Fordism, its crisis, and the develop-
ment of neo-liberalism in the context of globalization. The evolution of agriculture 
in Mexico under neo-liberalism is discussed in the second section, along with spe-
cific information on the state of Chiapas. The third section illustrates the case study, 
documents the expansion of the African palm culture for the production of palm 
oil, and discusses the contradictions associated with this process. The contradictory 
dimension of state intervention is analysed in the next section. Finally, from the case 
study it is concluded that alternatives to both neo-liberalism and new forms of state 
intervention could be desirable solutions in agriculture and food.
Figure 2. Areas of research, Soconusco and Costa, Chiapas, Mexico.
Source: authors’ elaboration on map from Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.
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Context: Fordism and Neo-liberalism
The setting for this research is the state of Chiapas in Mexico and the context is neo-
liberal globalization (Prasad, 2006; Crouch, 2011). In the early 1980s, Mexico began to 
introduce neo-liberal measures in the governing of its economy and society (Merrill 
and Miró, 1996; Morton, 2003; Otero, 2004). This was part of the international pro-
cess to address the crisis of Fordism (Aglietta, 1979; D. Harvey, 1989, 2005; Stiglitz, 
2002; Bonanno and Constance, 2008). Throughout most of the twentieth century and, 
particularly, after World War II, Fordism was the system of organized capitalism that 
coordinated mass production and mass consumption, generated steady accumula-
tion, enhanced democratic legitimacy, produced unparalleled economic growth and 
abundance, and forged a consumer culture. In advanced societies, the ‘capital–la-
bour accord’ gave management ultimate control over the labour process and pro-
duction, but organized labour was granted collective bargaining power to negotiate 
salary, benefits, and work conditions. Consequently, many workers shared substan-
tially in productivity gains, and enjoyed much increased benefits. Participating ac-
tively in politics, unions helped to shape policymaking, planning, and labour leg-
islation. The Fordist state employed Keynesian policies of advanced fiscal controls, 
broader socio-economic regulation, and expanded health, education, and welfare 
benefits. The middle class grew enormously, and many people attained the stand-
ard consumer package and sharply improved living conditions. Post-war Fordism 
enhanced inclusion of many formerly marginalized people, raised the social wage, 
and advanced equal opportunity and equality of condition, especially in social de-
mocracies. However, the middle class and the overall class system remained com-
plexly and steeply stratified. The lowest strata benefited little, and sharp inequalities 
between dominant and subordinate races, ethnic groups, and genders, production 
workers and professionals, non-union workers and unionized workers, as well as 
the economic distance between developed and developing countries manifested the 
era’s political compromises and pattern of bureaucratization. Inequalities of this sort 
existed to some degree worldwide. In the advanced North, Fordism was criticized 
particularly as state intervention and mediation were viewed as forms of oppression 
and domination over the masses (Marcuse, 1964; O’Connor, 1974; Habermas, 1975; 
Offe, 1985). In the case of the South, Fordism was viewed as a system that extended 
the control of core countries and their multinational corporations over developing 
countries and their people, increasing economic and political dependency and dom-
ination (Frank, 1969).
At Fordism’s economic high tide, attacks came from all sides of the political spec-
trum for its alienating, depoliticizing, regimenting, homogenizing impacts. The 
intellectual right sharply criticized the political nature of state interventionism by 
showing its distortions and long list of unwanted consequences. In the classical 
manifesto of neo-liberalism, Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman directly criti-
cized Fordism in agriculture by lashing at commodity price support programmes 
(1982, pp. 181–182). Introduced to stabilize agricultural prices and support the in-
come of farmers – in particular for those operating small family farms – but also 
to control surplus labour, they were viewed as instances of wasteful expenses, bu-
reaucratization and inefficiency. For Friedman, price support programmes created 
unwanted surpluses, kept farmers on the land despite low income and poor expecta-
tions for economic growth, increased food prices for consumers and, paradoxically, 
discriminated against the very small, family farmers that they were supposed to 
assist. Government intervention altered the unbiased functioning of the market in 
318 Héctor B. Fletes-Ocón and Alessandro Bonanno
favour of a system determined through political negotiations and compromises that 
inevitably suffered from the influence of powerful special interests. In effect, Fried-
man argued that the creation of farm programmes in the US was the result of the 
over-representation of rural areas in the electoral system and Congress (1982, p. 181).
Equally critical of price support programmes were authors that wrote from the 
Left (Rodefeld et al., 1978; Buttel and Newby, 1980). Both the populist and Marxist 
Left attacked price support programmes for their ineffectiveness and inefficiency, 
waste of resources and, more importantly, for distributing funds in ways that dis-
criminated against poor segments of society. These criticisms were not just limited 
to the US but equally applied to other parts of the world, including the European 
Union (then European Economic Community), Japan and Australia (Johnson, 1973; 
Mottura and Pugliese, 1980). Sharply opposing pronouncements of supporters of 
neo-liberalism, the Left called for more democratic forms of state intervention that 
would bring substantive equality, freedom, and well-being to society (Jessop, 1982; 
Carnoy, 1984; Offe, 1985).
In less-developed countries such as Mexico, the benefits of Fordism were less 
visible. Yet and despite contradictory policies, state intervention redistributed re-
sources, created needed infrastructure, and allowed a good portion of the numer-
ous peasant class to stay on the land (Hewitt, 1999; Otero, 1999, 2004). While social 
inequality and instability remained high and the urban elites increased their power 
and wealth, price-support programme mechanisms, land redistribution measures, 
investment in infrastructure, and entitlements de facto contained migration from ru-
ral to urban areas and to the US and guaranteed low but sustainable living standards 
to rural residents. To a significant extent, peasant agriculture was supported and its 
development encouraged (Weller, 1998; Hofman, 2000). In Mexico, import substitu-
tion strategies initiated in the 1950s boosted industrial production and productivity 
while the stable exchange of the peso promoted exports. The result was a significant 
expansion of the economy that, by the end of the 1960s, enabled Mexico to be largely 
self-sufficient in food crops and most consumer goods (Merrill and Miró, 1996; Pe-
chlaner and Otero, 2010). In agriculture, investment for the creation of infrastructure 
expanded cultivated land while efforts in extension improved the quality and quan-
tity of production, including that generated by the peasantry. To be sure and despite 
these improvements, the problems of poverty and immigration remained (Galarza, 
1964; Merrill and Miró, 1996; Hewitt, 1999; Otero, 2004).
By the early 1970s, more competitive international markets, high social welfare 
costs, the oil crisis, recession, social resistance, and other problems led to Fordism’s 
demise. Supporters of neo-liberal globalization saw the Fordist state to be the cause 
of economic contractions and related social pathologies. The appeal of neo-liberal 
ideology and Anglo-American efforts to weaken labour, slash the welfare state, re-
duce wealthy people’s tax burden, deregulate the private sector, and privatize the 
public domain undermined Fordism. Particularly successful was the neo-liberal de-
sign to replace the politically driven state intervention with ‘neutral’ market forces 
(Habermas, 1975). Friedman and like-minded neo-liberal theorists argued that state 
intervention is always influenced by powerful interest groups and rarely works ef-
ficiently and to the benefit of the intended groups. Conversely, market forces operate 
in ways that are independent from particular interests and tend to reward meritori-
ous groups and actions. Through market forces all people will receive what they 
deserve (Friedman, 1982, pp. 180–185). The appeal of this proposal was significant 
as it represented a credible alternative to the dissatisfying inefficiency and ineffec-
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tiveness of state intervention and its wasteful costs, large bureaucracy, and frequent 
abuses (Friedman, 1982).
The establishment of neo-liberal globalization marked an era in which the appli-
cation of market mechanisms, a much reduced social state, and the enhanced mo-
bility of capital characterized the economy and society. Equally important was the 
subordination of political decisions to market forces. The pursuit of profit in the free 
market was elevated as the most fundamental condition of the operation of society 
(D. Harvey, 2003, 2005). This economization of politics defined neo-liberal globaliza-
tion (Bonanno and Cavalcanti, 2011).4
As neo-liberal globalization expanded, contradictions mounted and economic, 
social and political crises emerged. Solutions, however, were increasingly sought 
through state intervention rather than market mechanisms (Underhill and Zhang, 
2008; Helleiner, 2010; Raulet, 2011; Pollard, 2012). While supporters of neo-liberal 
globalization called for additional market liberalization and austerity measures,5 
state intervention has been viewed as the most effective solution. Dismissing con-
servative and left-leaning arguments against Fordism, neo-Fordists stressed the rel-
evance of state intervention at the economic, social and political levels. Economically 
(e.g. Krugman, 2012; Pollard, 2012), the importance of Keynesian economic policies 
(deficit spending and market regulation) was emphasized along with the historical 
ability of these policies to address deep recessions. Politically (e.g. Raulet, 2011), they 
denounced the neo-liberal posture that equates profit making with ‘good for all’ 
political decisions. This ‘economization of politics’, they contended, limited political 
participation of the middle and working classes. Giving priority to processes guar-
anteed by state intervention, they argued that balanced mechanisms that foster eco-
nomic growth but also social stability should be achieved. Socially (e.g. Collins et al., 
2008), neo-liberalism’s restructuring of social welfare mechanisms and programmes 
largely eliminated their availability to, and effectiveness for, the working and mid-
dle classes. A return to state intervention in the social was viewed as necessary and 
a fundamental condition to stimulate demand, reignite socio-economic growth and 
generate pacified and stable social relations. Despite the relevance of many of these 
pronouncements, the fact that state intervention has not been as effective as hoped 
in the solution of problems has brought to the fore the question of the desirability of 
a return to Fordist style measures.
Setting
Mexico
In agriculture in Mexico, the implementation of neo-liberalism centered on the pro-
gressive elimination of state-sponsored programmes and opening of markets. Tar-
geted were support programmes like those that supported peasant agriculture, local 
food production and consumption, and land redistribution. The acceleration of this 
process in the 1990s is symbolized by the reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Consti-
tution, which de facto abolished the ejido system in 1992, and Mexico’s membership 
of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in 1994 (Cornelius and Myhre, 
1998; Otero, 1999, 2004; Morton, 2003). The ejido system was one of the institutions 
directly derived from the Mexican Revolution of 1910–1920. It provided public land6 
to peasants and was intended to be a system in support of peasant agriculture. It also 
allowed the existence of networks of local food production that permitted campesinos 
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to have access to basic food stuff. The reform of the ejido system made this land avail-
able for commercial use. Simultaneously, the Mexican state ended its support of ag-
ricultural labour and de facto promoted its immigration to the US (A. Bartra, 2004). 
The signing of the NAFTA in 1992 and its implementation in 1994 opened Mexi-
can agriculture to US and Canadian exports. Without the protection of government 
programmes, local farmers could not compete with producers from the North, and 
Mexico imports of basic food stuff increased rapidly and dramatically (González 
Chávez and Macías Macías, 2007). As a result, Mexican producers were forced to 
specialize in the export of high value products such as fruits and vegetables and 
relatively reduce the production on basic food products such as corn.
An important consequence of this change was the policy shift from the Fordist 
‘food security’ to the neo-liberal ‘market opportunities’. Under Fordism, one of the 
objectives of the domestic agricultural policy was to generate adequate production 
to satisfy the needs of the country and those of the poor and working population 
in urban and rural areas alike (Ramirez Silva, 1989). In this context, in the four dec-
ades following World War II, agriculture was identified as a strategic sector that 
could support the expansion of urban areas and the interests of the ruling class, but 
also control the overabundant rural labour force and deliver some benefits to peas-
ants and small producers (R. Bartra, 1974; Ramirez Silva, 1989; Merrill and Miró, 
1996). The neo-liberal shift to ‘market opportunities’, conversely, decoupled social 
goals from economic objectives and made the market-driven search for profit the 
essential dimension of the national agricultural policy. While a handful of producers 
benefited from neo-liberal measures and the growth of the export market, the vast 
majority of farmers experienced a deterioration of their living conditions, campesinos 
lost most of their ability to produce food for self-consumption and lower and middle 
classes urban consumers were hurt by food prices increases (González Chávez and 
Macías Macías, 2007; Pechlaner and Otero, 2010). There was a progressive impover-
ishment of the Mexican peasantry and small and medium producers as programmes 
created to alleviate the opening of the market were poorly funded and inadequate 
to improve production structures and productivity (Otero, 2004). As market forces 
and unfair competition from the North – commodity support programmes remained 
much stronger in US and Canada (Pechlaner and Otero, 2010) – depressed living 
conditions in rural areas, immigration increased (A. Bartra, 2004). Defined as ‘the 
import of food and the export of farmers’ (A. Bartra, 2004), neo-liberal agricultural 
policy worsened the conditions of many segments of Mexican society (Pechlaner 
and Otero, 2010).
Chiapas: Resistance to Neo-liberalism and Neo-Fordism
In the case of Chiapas, Table 1 indicates the extent to which the use of land devoted 
to the production for domestic consumption (primarily corn) has been redirected to 
the production of industrial or export crops. In this respect, the case of Chiapas fol-
lows the same pattern experience in the rest of the country (Lechuga, 2006). Yet the 
recent history and overall conditions of Chiapas are significantly different from that 
of the rest of Mexico. Located at the southern tip of Mexico, bordering Guatemala, 
Chiapas is synonymous with poverty, social marginalization, and a high concentra-
tion of ‘indigenous population’ or indios. The most recent official data indicate that 
about 32% of the local population is defined as ‘indigenous’. Although agricultural 
production has historically been the primary economic activity, in the last 20 years 
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the average size of local farms has decreased from 13 to 8.6 hectares and the num-
ber of farms that remained active in agriculture has also decreased from 99.5% to 
88.2% of all farms (INEGI, 2007). This was the result of a complex set of factors that 
included the fragmentation of property due to inheritance (land divided among the 
members of the farm family) and the use of land for alternative activities. In this 
context, more production has been directed toward fruits and vegetables and crops 
for industrial use, such as the African palm sugar cane and mango, and less toward 
food crops for local consumption.
On January 1, 1994, as NAFTA took effect, the Zapatista Army of National Lib-
eration (or EZLN) initiated a rebellion against the Mexican government. They de-
nounced the exploitative nature of neo-liberal globalization as the claim of ‘land, 
freedom and self-determination for the indigenous people and the dispossessed’ 
echoed around the world. What became a peaceful movement forced the neo-liberal 
Mexican government to grant local residents significant autonomy. Simultaneously, 
the Mexican government inaugurated a policy of support and socio-economic in-
tervention in Chiapas with the declared objectives to combat poverty and promote 
development. However, the actual agenda had social control and the appeasement 
of the large pro-Zapatista international public opinion as its unspoken goals.7 In es-
sence, the otherwise neo-liberal Mexican state initiated a Fordist style interventionist 
strategy to exercise social control in Chiapas.
In this context, the state of Chiapas was granted a de facto special status, and the 
issues of autonomy for the indigenous people, socio-economic growth, resistance to 
social exclusion, and opposition to neo-liberalism constantly occupied centre stage 
in the international arena. This situation translated into a continuous economic in-
tervention of the Mexican state in Chiapas as, in 2011 alone, the Mexican govern-
ment spent the equivalent of USD 0.5 billion for programmes in this state. Among 
these government-sponsored programmes were the ‘social development’ and the 
‘fight against inequality’ initiatives. These types of Fordist programmes received 
almost two third of the funds and significantly more than other and more market-
Year 1993 2001 2008 2011
Corn 744 926 938 908 699 921 711 199
Coffee 231 328 241 029 254 275 257 367
Beans 97 520 126 353 118 471 118 391
Palm 3,823 16 793 19 290 38 525
Sugar cane 20 651 27 496 28 817 31 584
Mango 13 101 17 656 25 979 26 484
Banana 22 599 23 845 25 007 24 355
Cocoa 30 000 22 637 19 781 19 717
Sorghum 8,133 13 431 14 862 13 306
Soy 6,868 11 978 10 614 14 366
Sesame 1,359 9,544 8,388 9,073
Watermelon 1,707 1,267 2,363 1,779
Rice 2,119 847 1,406 523
Beef NA 2 531 102* 2 387 567 2 538 781
Pork NA 674 882* 780 429 772 644
Table 1. Land employed for principal crops in hectares, Chiapas, changes 1993–
2011.
Note: *data refer to 2002.
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from Servicio de Información Agroalimentaria y Pesquera.
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oriented projects such as the Chiapas Competitivo y Generador de Oportunidades 
(for a competitive Chiapas creator of opportunities). Additional funds were made 
available through international programmes that provided resources to the Mexican 
government (Sabines, 2011). It is important to stress that these programmes were 
directed primarily to small farms as farming remains a fundamental component of 
the local economy (Sabines, 2011).
The Case
The Expansion of African Palm Production and the Politics of Agrofuel
One of the programmes initiated by the Mexican state in Chiapas consisted of sup-
port for the cultivation of the African palm. The rationale for this intervention rested 
primarily on two items. First, the Mexican government sought ways to legitimize 
its actions in regard to the poor socio-economic conditions of, and political instabil-
ity in, Chiapas. In particular, the deep-rooted problem of poverty in the region re-
mained too visible and required intervention. Additionally, the domestic but, above 
all, international public opinion depicted the Mexican state’s actions in Chiapas as 
‘authoritarian’. Programmes that would mitigate this negative image appeared nec-
essary and desirable (Morton, 2011; Ramor, 2011). Second, a wave of protest against 
the instability of, and increases in, corn prices and concerns over the use of food 
crops for the production of ethanol prompted the Mexican government to attempt to 
reduce the use of fossil fuel through the production of renewable energy sources that 
did not involve corn and other food crops. Because of its agronomic performance,8 
the cultivation of the African palm was identified as an effective means to produce 
agrofuel (Ramirez Zamora, 1991; Pineda Morales, 2009).
Funds for the African palm project came also from the local government. Both 
federal and local state officials defined the African palm project as an opportunity to 
stimulate the local economy and create growth for the impoverished local popula-
tion while contributing to the energy and food questions. Reducing the amount of 
food crops used for energy production had become a widely supported proposition. 
This rationale was reminiscent of Fordist plans as it contemplated the implemen-
tation of productive activities whose declared objectives were the socio-economic 
development of local communities and their social stability. These objectives broke 
with calls for ‘market opportunities’ that had defined the actions of the Mexican 
state since the 1990s (Morton, 2011).
To be sure, in this project the federal government took a much more prominent 
role than the local government even though the local government enacted many of 
the project measures. Following a tradition of centralized authority and reduce local 
autonomy, the hierarchical posture that characterized federal–local state interaction 
in Mexico was reproduced (A. Bartra, 2004; Morton, 2011). In this context, Chiapas 
state officials acted in ways that adapted to the requirements of Federal plans. Con-
cerns about often-imposed sanctions – such as reduced budget allocations and the 
curtailing of political careers of local officials – shaped the moves of the officialdom 
of the local state. Exceptions to the strict control of Federal authorities consisted 
primarily of situations in which local mobilization supported local government’s 
actions. In Chiapas during the years of the Zapatista uprising, the relationship be-
tween the EZLN and the local government represents a case in point (N. Harvey, 
1998; Collier, 2008).9
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Originally cultivated in Guinea, West Africa, the African palm was imported to 
South and Central America in the twentieth century. Along with Mexico, six other 
countries – Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Brazil, and Guatemala – have 
been actively engaged in its production. In Chiapas, the palm appeared in the 1950s 
(Ramirez Zamora, 1991; Pineda Morales, 2009). The weather, humidity, and height 
and depth of the soil in the area proved a perfect ecosystem for its development, and, 
today, palm oil has become one of the most profitable products for vegetable oil. The 
oil is divided into ‘crude oil’ and ‘kernel oil’. The crude oil is generated from the 
crushing of the palm fruit. Kernel oil is extracted from small almond-like fruits that 
can be found in the centre of the palm. Both types of oils are widely used as they are 
employed as primary ingredients in the production of more than 200 items and as 
components for about 900 more in a variety of industries, including food, house and 
cleaning products, and cosmetics (Pineda Morales, 2009). In Mexico, the production 
of palm oil is distributed in three regions of the tropical humid South and Southeast. 
In the South in the state of Chiapas, palms are produced in Soconusco, Costa and 
Selva regions. In the Gulf of Mexico, production is concentrated in the state of Ver-
acruz and in the state Campeche. Chiapas is the largest and most efficient producer, 
with about 67% of the total land cultivated, 81% of production, and the highest yield 
(17 metric tons per hectare in 2010) (López Trujillo, 2007, p. 47; SIAP, 2010).
In 1952, 30,000 seeds were imported and planted on 200 hectares by a local firm. 
The establishment of this first commercial plantation was accompanied by the con-
struction of the first plant for the extraction of the oil. Later, this firm introduced 
new seeds from the Ivory Coast and increased production on 700 hectares (Ramirez 
Zamora, 1991, p. 5; Velasco, 2010). Growth was steady but remained relatively lim-
ited. In was in the mid-1970s that the National Commission for the Cultivation of 
Fruits (CONAFRUT) began to promote the crop. For this purpose and until 1982, 
CONAFRUT imported more than one million seeds from Indonesia, the Ivory Coast, 
and Costa Rica and equipment with the processing capacity of two tons of fruits per 
hour. In the following years, planting spread through the area and palms appeared 
in a number of communities. Yet, problems seemed to outnumber benefits. Issues 
with crop management, poor skills in the processing of the fruits, and limited avail-
ability of funds to finance operations were listed as reasons for the poor performance 
of the crop by the Mexican Department of Agriculture. In effect, limited extension 
support and experience with the crop prevented farmers from achieving desired 
results.10
In the 1990s, the political instability and social protest generated by the action of 
the Zapatista movement, and, to a lesser extent, the search for alternative energy 
sources created impetus for state intervention. A new push to increase palm oil pro-
duction began in 1996, during the government of Ernesto Zedillo. At that time, palm 
oil demand amounted to 130,000 metric tons, but domestic production could satisfy 
only 3% of this demand. Accordingly, the federal government proposed the cultiva-
tion of an additional 2.5 million hectares. Among the states selected for the project, 
Chiapas occupied a central position (Pineda Morales, 2009). State intervention con-
tinued into the new century and the Ministry of Rural Development of Chiapas sup-
ported by federal funds established the Palm Oil Production System in 2004. This 
programme was implemented in the Soconusco region in 2006, under the name of 
the Palm Oil Programme.
The administration of President Calderón (2006–2012) proposed a more sophis-
ticated policy that specifically attempted to legitimize state actions while fostering 
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processes of capital accumulation. Faced with the contradiction between food pro-
duction and the cultivation of crops for alternative energy sources, this Adminis-
tration recommended the cultivation of African palms on marginal land only. ‘[I 
propose]’, Calderón wrote, ‘the utilization of marginal land to obtain the inputs nec-
essary for the production of agrofuel. This process should not affect food security 
and should not affect the security of the environment’. Dwelling on this strategy, 
two programmes were created: the ‘Programme of Sustainable Production of Inputs 
and the Programme of Introduction of Bioenergetic Products’ (Calderón, 2008, pp. 
266, 267). Following these directives, in Chiapas, state intervention in agriculture 
was shaped to go ‘beyond food production’ and develop new energy sources to 
meet the challenges of the society and the needs of the Mexican population (Sabines, 
2007, p. 219).
In support of this strategy, in February 2008 the act named Promotion and Devel-
opment of Bioenergy was passed. Its objective was to foster energy diversification 
and sustainable development in order to guarantee support for Mexican rural areas. 
Following the approval of this act, in May 2008, the federal government introduced 
the Inter-sectorial Strategy for Bioenergy. It called for ‘the promotion and expansion 
of production lines of biomass inputs and the production of bioenergy that would 
promote energy security through the diversification of energy sources. It would gen-
erate and integrate synergies and provide support for sustainable rural develop-
ment’ (Calderón, 2008, p. 209). The government further developed the programme 
Sustainable Production of Inputs for Bioenergy and for Scientific and Technological 
Development. In this context, it was established to bring to production 300 000 hec-
tares of African palm with a first installment of 70 000 hectares in 2009 (Calderón, 
2008, p. 209).
The Calderón administration and the local state viewed the promotion of agrofuel 
as part of the overall process of intervention for the modernization of Chiapas and 
as a way to address social, environmental, and economic concerns. An official state-
ment – aptly named ‘productive reconversion’ – described this effort accordingly: 
‘[Our objective] is to promote the substitution of traditional crops, such as corn for 
self-consumption, that affects the environment [sic], with others that are sustainable 
and that maximize profit’ (Government of Chiapas, 2009, p. 1). The state government 
further proposed the Chiapas Solidario Development Plan for 2007–2012. According 
to this programme, priority was given to the introduction of new agrofuel-orient-
ed crops given the limited availability of renewable energy in Mexico. Moreover, 
a report of the Mexican Petroleum Institute underscored the importance presented 
by future diversity of fuel markets in the case of both fossil and renewable energy 
(Sabines, 2007, p. 218). It also argued that the introduction of new crops for renew-
able energy would generate new research for agrofuel production with limited or no 
environmental impact, such as biodiesel, ethanol, hydrogen and methane. In 2007, 
the state of Chiapas established the Institute of Bioenergy and Alternative Energy 
and, just in the region of Soconusco, three palm nurseries. These nurseries supplied 
plants to producers at no cost (Pineda Morales, 2009).
To be sure, the neo-Fordist dimension of this posture was tempered by appeals 
to market conditions. Featuring a deficit in vegetable oils and fats, in 2012 Mexico 
imported about 85% of its 400 000 ton demand of palm oil. The Chiapas state gov-
ernment calculated that ‘it would be necessary to have a production area of about 
115 000 hectares, with an average yield of 18 tons per hectare, for 2 million tons of 
crop to cover the domestic demand’ (IRBIO, 2011). To that end the state of Chiapas 
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planned to plant palms on 100 000 hectares during the six year period of 2007–2012. 
It was hoped to have 68 000 hectares operational in 2011 (IRBIO, 2011). Arguing that 
agrofuel production should ‘provide a greater amount of renewable energy for pub-
lic transport’, the state built three processing plants in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Cintalapa, 
and Puerto Madero. As the price of palm oil remained high and following the de-
coupling of agricultural production from food production, numerous political and 
business actors decided to pursue the cultivation of the African palm rather than 
food crops. Indeed, the land devoted to the production of palms increased by 19 000 
hectares from 2008 to 2011.
Pronouncements about the effectiveness, extent, and benefits of state intervention 
contradicted the outcomes of this process. In the early stages of the programme, 
the state provided support to farmers through a variety of programmes, including 
the establishment of fields, cleaning, fertilization, and harvesting as well as direct 
payments. Later, most of these programmes ended because of fiscal problems of the 
state. In recent years, support has been limited to the delivery of the young plants 
and minor support for the first year of operation. Additionally, despite state claims 
about the use of palm oil for agrofuel production, it has actually been employed 
exclusively for other industrial uses. The lack of infrastructure, the unavailability of 
an ineffective distribution system, and production costs higher than those of fossil 
fuel have prevented the expansion of agrofuel in Mexico. Accordingly, state inter-
vention has remained characterized by fiscal problems while state pronouncements 
present an image that is different from the actual development of the region. It can 
be argued, therefore, that state intervention is not only limited by fiscal problems, 
but attempts to legitimize it clash with an overtly different reality.
To be sure, farmers did respond to these government programmes by increas-
ing their participation in the cultivation of the African palm. Interviews with local 
producers indicated that they perceived an advantage in producing palms primarily 
because of market conditions. The fact that the state provided free trees was con-
sidered important, yet secondary. These two factors, local farmers contend, created 
significant incentive to initiate implantation of the monoculture. They pointed out, 
however, that the transition from food to industrial production was not without 
problems.
First, because of higher prices, farmers planted palms on prime land. The plant-
ing of palms on land that has been employed traditionally for the production of 
corn, sesame, plátano macho (a local banana variety), vegetables, fruits for export (as 
mango) and pastures is now common in Chiapas (Fletes, 2011). Also, palms have 
appeared on protected areas land. For example, palms have appeared on a 7,000 
hectare section of the Selva Lacandona (in Southeast Chiapas), an ecosystem reserve 
that should have been off limits to any commercial culture and on Encrucijada (Soco-
nusco), a biosphere reserve. Additionally, the fact that surrounding parcels are also 
planted diminishes the diversity of the ecosystem and makes it more vulnerable to 
decay and pests (Fletes et al., 2010) (see Figure 3).
Second, and as mentioned above, farmers experienced economic difficulties dur-
ing the three years needed to generate the first crop. Earlier, the state provided mon-
etary payments for the productive reconversion. As this programme ended and eco-
nomic problems became more difficult to handle, farmers began to plant food crops 
along with palm trees, compromising the efficiency of both types of cultures.11
Third, because more land is devoted to industrial crops, fewer food crops are 
sent to local markets and less food is available for self-consumption. According to 
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estimates from a local survey (Fletes, 2010), about 20% of local food production was 
replaced by palms. Additionally, interviews with local farmers tell stories of substi-
tution of palm production for food crops. One farmer states: ‘I plant only palms… I 
do not believe that planting other crops is efficient… I used to produce rice, corn and 
bananas in great quantities but now I produce only palms.’ Another farmer says: ‘I 
had cattle but also mango and corn. But now it’s all palms.’ In a context in which 
the availability of food crops is already insufficient, the growth of palm production 
has been accompanied by food imports from national and international markets. Ac-
cordingly, food is available increasingly through formal market transactions and is 
less available to those of limited means. As some farmers were able to increase their 
cash flow, others suffered the consequences of the formalization of food consump-
tion (see Figure 4).
This is a situation that has affected the level of food sovereignty of local residents. 
Finally, the instability of the oil market makes producers (particularly the many 
small farmers in the regions) vulnerable to decreases in price. With virtually no al-
ternatives to the monoculture and limited ability of the state to assist, drops in prices 
have serious consequences to the local economy and communities (see Figure 5).
Processing Plants and Farmers
Throughout most of the 1990s, the limited presence of processing plants or extracto-
ras prevented farmers from increasing the participation in programmes to expand 
palm production. In Soconusco only two plants were in operation at the time. Given 
the relatively limited processing capacity and growing supply, farmers could not sell 
their production and were often forced to leave their crops to rot in the fields. This 
situation was partially altered in the subsequent years and, by 2012, there were sev-
en processing plants located in the state. This was the result of state plans to facilitate 
Figure 3. Palm plantations on basic crop and fruit areas in the ecosystem reserve 
Encrucijada.
Source: authors’ GPS map.
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the expansion of the processing capacity in the area and the actions of domestic and 
international processing companies. This strategy was not only designed to improve 
production but also to address farmers’ concerns and limit the discrepancy between 
the relatively high fruit production and limited processing capacity. Overall, these 
changes allowed farmers to contend that, today, the African palm is the best crop in 
the region in terms of the economic returns it generates.
Local farmers’ enthusiasm about the economic side of the implantation of this 
crop is also associated with the quantity and system of payment. The price of crude 
oil is set by the international market, which is driven by the world’s largest produc-
er, Malaysia. There was an increase in price in 2007 when it reached about USD 750 
Figure 4. Protected ecological reserves in Chiapas (areas in green).
Source: authors’ elaboration on data from Red Ecosur..
Figure 5. Areas of palm production and ecological reserves in the state of Chiapas.
Source: authors’ eleboration on data from CONANP, 2013.
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per metric ton. During the following two years, the price declined but subsequently 
rose steadily. By 2011, crude oil sold at about USD 1,100 per metric ton. The price 
paid to producers is set by the extractora. It is published at the plant and updated 
periodically, allowing producers to know exactly how much they would receive for 
their crop. The local price paid in 2012 was about USD 130 per metric ton. Prices also 
change according to the delivery destination. Direct delivery of fruits to processing 
plants commands higher prices than those paid at delivery points – or recibas. Dis-
tant recibas pay lower prices.
Farmers also like the payment system. They receive a check when fruits are de-
livered to the receiving facility. These checks are highly appreciated as they could 
be cashed immediately and, given their popularity, circulate as informal currency. 
Because the fruits can be harvested every 15 days and the price is known in advance, 
this rapid payment system and its transparency represent a significant departure 
from existing practices. With other crops, such as fruits, vegetables, and grains, pric-
es are set by a complex system run by intermediaries and are frequently unknown 
to farmers. Despite the fact that processing plants determine the price to be paid, 
farmers feel that they have more control of their business in palm production than 
in the case of other crops.
This rosy view of the growth of African palm cultivation is accompanied, how-
ever, by problems for farmers. They view those who manage/own processing plants 
as actors who have significant power over them. While processing plants need raw 
material to operate, plant managers’ ability to choose among a relatively large num-
ber of producers give them asymmetrical power over farmers. In effect, managers 
of extractoras not only do establish actual buying prices, but decide with whom to 
do business. Farmers that are not liked by managers risk not being able to sell their 
crops. Moreover, farmers feel that the experience of processing plant leaders and 
their knowledge of the sector puts them at a disadvantage. This power asymmetry is 
identified as a source of uncertainty for farmers. Additionally, attempts to establish 
agreements with extractoras through the 2000s resulted in farmers’ increased mis-
trust. As a result, processing plants are viewed as entities that want to take advan-
tage of farmers. Often, farmers have asked for the support of local state officials to 
address this problem. However, state intervention in this controversy has lacked as 
mediation between the parties has not materialized, and the local state has not been 
able to mitigate the mistrust that farmers harbour for extractoras.
Farmers’ dissatisfaction with the power of extractoras has translated into resist-
ance. In particular, farmers decided to draw plans to own an extractora. In 1999, a 
number of small producers joined forces to form an association that included 300 
members and about 2,500 hectares of land. In the following years, the difficult rela-
tionship between farmers and extractoras confirmed the farmers’ belief in the ben-
efits of owning a processing plant. Despite these good intensions, a number of ob-
stacles stood on the way, including the lack of financial resources and technical and 
managerial personnel. The turning point occurred in 2009 when the society was able 
to recruit a local engineer with background in the sector and work experience in the 
United States. Under the leadership of this individual and a local producer, the so-
ciety was able to recruit and train a sufficient number of technicians and workers to 
staff a plant. Additionally, this association was able to negotiate the use of an older 
facility that was built in the 1970s and, later, was placed out of production. The nego-
tiation was particularly successful and generated favourable conditions such as free 
rent. This plant became fully operational in 2009. Aided by available state-sponsored 
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programmes (such as the Tropico Humedo programme), the growing demand for 
crude oil, effective management, and support from farmers and the community, this 
group was able to generate sufficient capital and credit to build a new plant. Con-
struction initiated in 2011, and the new plant was completed in April 2012. Privately 
owned extractoras responded by establishing private support programmes for pro-
ducers such as programmes for the direct collection of harvested fruits on the field, 
sale of inputs at discounted prices, and technical assistance. Despite this support, the 
volume of fruits available to processing plants diminished because of the success of 
the farmer-owned plant.
Discussion
There are a number of problems that make state intervention in African palm pro-
duction in Chiapas ineffective and inefficient. At the economic level, the cultivation 
of the African palm did generate the positive result of higher returns for farmers. 
Despite being exposed to global market price fluctuations, farmers welcomed the 
system of direct payments and the practice to be paid frequently. Yet and despite 
state plans, palm production displaced food crops on prime land causing less food 
to be sent to local markets and available for self-consumption. Because local food 
consumption became increasingly connected to external food supply chains, farm-
ers and local residents became more and more exposed to food price fluctuations, 
depended on cash availability for the acquisition of food, and experienced a reduced 
level of food sovereignty. Ultimately, state intervention rather than diminishing the 
dependency of local farmers and residents on global markets, increased it. State ac-
tion was not able to reconcile the expanded economic opportunities for farmers with 
the overall socio-economic stability and well-being of the local community.
At the level of production of alternative energy on marginal land, state interven-
tion created a system that is significantly different from original plans. These plans 
contemplated the production of alternative, renewable energy on land that could 
not be employed for food production. Their desirability was justified by claims that 
they were beneficial to farmers, society and the safeguard of the environment. In 
reality, African palm oil produced in Chiapas was never employed in the energy sec-
tor. It has been exclusively employed as a food additive and industrial input. State 
plans for alternative energy production never materialized. As in other instances 
of agrofuel production, the negative environmental impact contradicts its assumed 
economic benefits. The CO2 emission of palm oil production is higher than that gen-
erated for the production of fossil fuels (Holt-Giménez and Kenfield, 2009; Jonasse, 
2009; Castaneda et al., 2011). It has been calculated that the carbon emission for oil 
production is 10 times larger that the emission generated for the production of fossil 
oil (Manrique, 2010). Accordingly, state intervention promoted a form of energy that 
is renewable but not environmentally and economically sound. The claim that the 
expansion of palm production would be on marginal land also never materialized. 
The state could not control its growth on prime land and on ecosystem reserves. 
These negative environmental consequences add to the problems associated with 
food availability for poor residents of the regions indicated above.
At the organizational and planning levels, state plans for cultural reconversion 
were inefficient. Despite goals to create payment programmes to support farmers’ 
incomes during the reconversion, the state’s fiscal crisis prevented the generation 
of adequate technical and economic assistance to producers. Furthermore, the state 
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could not control problems between farmers and processing plants. While the state 
facilitated the construction of a number of plants and supported the strategy to re-
duce the asymmetric power between extractoras and farmers, the control that plant 
managers and owners exercised over farmers remained strong. Farmers responded 
by establishing their own processing plant. As the confrontation continued, the state 
was unable to mediate between the parties.
Conclusions
The research presented in this article speaks directly to the issue of the desirability 
of state intervention in a context (Mexico) dominated by neo-liberal ideology and 
practices and in a region, Chiapas, characterized by economic underdevelopment 
and social unrest. The case of Chiapas’ production of the African palm represents 
an instance of state intervention that had a number of economic and social goals. 
Economically, it intended to improve the conditions of local producers and produce 
agrofuel as an alternative source of energy. The protection of the environment and 
the construction of sustainable forms of energy production were among the key ob-
jectives of the state. Similarly important was the state concern with social legitima-
tion. Chiapas has been the theatre of overt strong protest against the Mexican state 
that gained international support and visibility. State intervention was designed to 
control resistance and appease the local population. The African palm project was 
part of a state intervention plan to satisfy certain economic, social, environmental, 
and political objectives.
The many contradictions that characterized state intervention in Chiapas sup-
port the claims of ineffectiveness and inefficiency that fueled the neo-liberal critique 
of Fordism and its ideological and political clout over the last four decades. De-
spite explicit plans to promote economic expansion, enhance social stability, create 
alternative and renewable energy sources, and protect the environment, the results 
were off target. Following critique from the Left, state intervention maintained its 
class nature and failed to achieve substantive gains. While farmers’ incomes were 
enhanced, the overall exposure of local farmers and residents to the unwanted con-
sequences of market forces increased. Similarly, food sovereignty decreased as less 
food was accessible in local markets and its availability was increasingly linked to 
formal market mechanisms and the corporate actors that control them. State inter-
vention helped subordinate the lives of local residents to global forces and fostered 
their disembedding from the local context.
These contradictions cast doubts on the desirability of state intervention in a con-
text defined by the crisis of neo-liberal globalization. As neo-liberal globalization 
seems to have exhausted its legitimacy, the return to state intervention seems equal-
ly problematic. The state, in its national and local forms, seems ill-equipped to face 
economic, environmental, and developmental challenges in a context in which social 
relations are increasingly shaped by distant actors and processes. While the impor-
tance of state action cannot and should not be diminished, evidence from this case 
suggests that alternative options should be considered and eventually promoted if 
democratic forms of development and socio-economic growth are sought. In par-
ticular, the case study reveals the significance of local initiatives that are fueled by 
the aspirations and abilities of local residents. Two instances should be recalled in 
this respect: the establishment of a farmer-owned processing plant and the manner 
in which farmers handled the transition from food crops to the palm monoculture.
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The establishment of a farmer-owned processing plant is an example of the ability 
of local farmers and residents to mobilize available resources, create new and effec-
tive forms of organization, and propose locally generated plans for socio-economic 
development. The additional benefits of this empowering initiative are many and 
include the generation of added value that is kept in area, the harmonization of 
key facets of the production process, farmers’ control of the production process, the 
reduction of differences in power between farmers and the processing industry, and 
the strengthening of local social bonds and solidarity. The manner in which farmers 
handled the transition to the palm monoculture is telling of the ability of local resi-
dents to generate solutions to emerging problems. Simultaneously, it is also an indi-
cation of the limits that local initiatives may encounter in the absence of autonomous 
institutions of coordination and planning. This is particularly the case in a context 
characterized by strong centralized state action. While it was relevant for farmers to 
continue food production on land devoted to palm production, the coexistence of 
the two cultures was neither productively efficient nor environmentally sustainable. 
It appears, therefore, that the presence of local institutions that would coordinate 
these activities and that would allow a more direct participation from all stakehold-
ers could represent a beneficial turn.
Following the indications from the case study and as the debate on the crisis of 
neo-liberalism and the limits of a possible application of a neo-Fordism model un-
folds, attention to the initiatives of local actors and their empowerment, but also 
to the contradictions and limits that these actions entail, can constitute important 
elements in the discussion on the creation of better patterns of socio-economic de-
velopment.
Notes
1. To be sure, this literature does not argue that neo-liberal globalization is no longer dominant. It sim-
ply stresses that its various and recent crises have been addressed through proposals involving state 
intervention.
2. Mexico has been the theatre of the significant introduction of neo-liberal measures. While state in-
tervention in agriculture was not totally dismantled, it was reduced much more than in the US and 
Canada. These are Mexico’s counterparts in NAFTA (see Pechlaner and Otero, 2010). While some pro-
grammes and agencies were restructured but remained in place (i.e. the PROCAMPO programme, 
BANRURAL was renamed and reorganized as Financiera Rural), many others were eliminated. The 
turning point of this restructuring was the act Ley de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable passed in 2001. 
3. Fostering economic growth and legitimizing existing social arrangements were the declared objec-
tives of the Fordist state. In effect under Fordism, the success of any nation state was determined by 
its ability to promote capital accumulation and, simultaneously, maintain social legitimation (Agli-
etta, 1979; Carnoy, 1984; Lipietz, 1987, 1992; Antonio and Bonanno, 2000).
4. Despite ideological claims, under neo-liberal globalization corporations actively sought state sup-
port. In this regard, the reduction of state intervention refers to the ‘social state’. For an elaboration of 
this issue, see Bonanno and Cavalcanti, 2011.
5. Austerity measures resulted in economic stagnation, high unemployment rates, lack of productive 
investments, and the deterioration of public services. This neo-liberal action engendered resistance by 
the general public that protested declining socio-economic well-being and bleak future perspectives. 
It also created opposition from corporate groups that lamented limited state assistance and the lack 
of additional corporate freedom (Habermas, 2012; Lapavitsas, 2012).
6. The eijdo system adopted a number of ways to distribute land to campesinos. It distributed federal 
land; restituted lend to communities and small towns; expropriated private land and redistributed 
it to campesinos and more. Under the traditional system, eijdatarios (campesinos) were allowed to use 
communal land and control the products generated by the cultivation of this land.
7. There is a copious literature on the Zapatista movement and rebellion. See N. Harvey, 1998; Collier, 
2008; Ramor, 2011; Morton, 2011.
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8. The African palm has an annual yield of nearly 5,000 kilograms of oil per hectare (10 times greater 
that other oilseeds such as soy), which translates into approximately 6,000 liters of biodiesel (Pineda 
Morales, 2009; Miccolis and Teixeira de Andrade, 2012).
9. The relationship between the government of Chiapas and the EZLN is complex. While a formal al-
liance was never signed, this relationship was significantly different from the overt opposition that 
existed between the EZLN and the federal government.
10. According to the government: ‘This failure was due, among other things, to the fact that producers 
depended on credit for their operations. This credit was partial and inadequate. There were errors 
in the processing phase which affected the ability to create efficient processing plants. Finally, there 
were problems with the crop management strategies that were not clearly established’ (Velasco, 2010, 
p. 92).
11. Farmers indicate that the shade created by grown palms limits the growth of other crops. Addition-
ally, they also reported that practices for the cultivation of the palm are often incompatible with the 
needs of other crops.
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